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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

09/04/08
From Zero-Sum to Win-Win  —Mara Rudman, adviser, Middle East Progress; senior fellow, Center for American Progress. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.
09/04/08
How Progress Is Possible  —
08/07/08
How to Deal with Jerusalem  —Lt. Col. (Res.) Ron Shatzberg, Project Director, Economic Cooperation Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.

Setting the Record Straight

Two-State Solution Still Best Option

“In practical terms, we can reach two conclusions: First, a final-status agreement, although its details are known, cannot be secured in the foreseeable future. Second, the time has come to think about other solutions. One of them is a return not to the 1967 borders, but rather, to the reality that prevailed in 1967, when Jordan controlled the West Bank.”
—Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland, “The Jordanian Option,” YNet, September 3, 2008 versus
  • "On both sides of the green line and, indeed, wherever people think about solutions to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, a lot of old/new thinking is taking place. … Most of these ideas are patently unrealistic. Discussion of them often reflects despair, not pragmatic strategic thinking. … Precisely because there is no such alternative, other options more readily suggest themselves, ranging from temporary conflict management to three states or entities. Nor does failure today mean that tomorrow we cannot try again to arrive at a two-state solution, which remains the best option for all."
    —Yossi Alpher, coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications & former director, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, "One State Definitely Not an Option," bitterlemons.org, August 18, 2008
  • Middle East Analysis

    • How Progress Is Possible —Hiba Husseini, chair, Legal Committee to Final Status Negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis; former vice chairperson of the Palestine Securities Exchange (1998-May 2005). Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
    • Perils of an Israeli Transition —The New York Times, Editorial
    • The Arabs Will Look Differently Upon America —Ron Pundak, director general of the Peres Center for Peace and former architects and negotiators of the Oslo Agreement (bitterlemons.org)
    June 20, 2007

    Taghreed El-Khodary

    "There is a feeling [among Palestinians] that Fateh, Hamas, Israel and the U.S. all share responsibility for what is happening to them."

    Daily life has not yet resumed. People are overwhelmed with loss and uncertainty, buying basic commodities and remaining indoors, afraid of what may be coming next, afraid that Israel will cut off electricity, water, medical supplies, food supplies, and petrol.

    All people can predict is more fear from Hamas, which is unable to clarify its political vision for the future.

    Very few government employees are going to work. Yesterday, a group of Finance Ministry employees, who last week worked for then Unity Government Finance Minister, now Abbas-appointed Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad, went to their jobs at the Ministry at 8 but left at 10. They said "we are lost … we don’t understand which government’s orders we should abide by. The one in the West Bank or the one in Gaza.”

    All have families. All have loans. All suffered due what is perceived as the U.S. economic embargo that was imposed on all governmental employees since the January 2006 elections, to undermine Hamas. Palestinians in Gaza are still in a state of shock. They are expecting the darkest days in their lives yet to come. They keep talking about their beloved children.

    Policemen are also confused. A government in the West Bank is calling on them not to work with Hamas and Hamas in Gaza is telling them to resume work to achieve one of their main challenges, namely, "internal security." A member of the national security forces said “I won’t go to the office now to work with Hamas. I will feel humiliated. Abbas said to remain at home and he will send us a salary."

    Another member of the preventive security apparatus is hidden at home. His brother told me, “We are afraid that the Qassam will shoot him in the knee."

    The moderates, the independents, and the silent majority are afraid to walk around. For the first time in their lives there is a feeling that they do not belong; a feeling that Fateh, Hamas, Israel and the U.S. all share responsibility for what is happening to them.

    Fateh is seen as responsible for not focusing on reforming itself even after Hamas won the elections. Following the death of Arafat in November 2004 the internal divisions within Fateh deepened. And after their dismal showing in the January 2006 elections, they focused only on how to make Hamas fail; how to spread lawlessness in Gaza to push the people to call for new elections to oust Hamas. This wishful thinking of Fateh seemed to be supported by the U.S. administration.

    The moderates blame Hamas for such a gruesome coup d’etat on the Palestinian government. Yes, they agree with Hamas that some Fateh people are corrupt, causing lawlessness and not giving Hamas the chance to govern and to improve daily life for Palestinians. But people find it difficult to justify the killing of Palestinians by Palestinians. As shocking was the image of "freedom fighters" — those fighting against Israel military occupation — replaced by images of the same militia looting public property. And the brutality with which Hamas dealt with those surrendering during the fighting was similarly jolting – but has also scared daring voices to speak out in protest.

    Palestinian moderates believe that the U.S. repeatedly managed to make the situation worse through deliberate neglect, clumsy intervention, and by too often listening only to Israel and those Palestinians unpopular on the ground, viewed as corrupt and abusing their positions in the security forces.

    The U.S. administration has failed to understand reality on the ground. It has failed to understand how to deal with Hamas. Those Qassam militia members and some Hamas political leaders have been wanted by Israel and by Fateh, and tortured by Fateh, who are viewed as the American allies. Hamas’ actions against Fateh are also seen as revenge against the U.S.

    Qassam militia members and their families are the only people happy now in the Gaza Strip. For the first time they are walk around freely. They drive cars that used to belong to President Abbas and his security forces, and to senior Fateh senior officials, cars that are thought to have been provided by the U.S.

    At the preventive security compound, formerly controlled by the Palestinian Authority and Fateh-led security forces, tens of the Qassam militia families are smiling, praying, welcoming friends to see a place they used to hate, to show what they did to the place and how they won the battle.

    One member shows his friend the cell where he was tortured by Palestinian Authority officials. Only 23 years old now, he says he joined Qassam during the second intifida, in 2000, because “Hamas comes from the mosque. It’s pure. Hamas listens to me. Hamas takes care of my family."

    In Gaza, Hamas will have to confront many challenges, including legitimacy, internal security, and food supplies. Should Israel seal Gaza, how will they provide people with essential supplies such as electricity and water, which are under Israeli control?

    In the West Bank, the situation is also uncertain. Employees are relieved that they will get their full salary on time since the international embargo is to be lifted. But what comes next, what will happen with Hamas there, and what will become of the dream of all for a Palestinian state, this is more unknown than ever.

    This is definitely the worst time Palestinians have faced. What makes it so painful, is that they are responsible for it.

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