Mara Rudman on Rosner’s Domain (Haaretz)

This conversation orginally appeared on Haaretz.com.

Mara Rudman is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and an advisor to Middle East Progress. She is also President of Quorum Strategies, an international strategic consulting firm.

From 1997 to 2001, Rudman served at the White House, including as a deputy national security advisor to President Clinton and National Security Council Chief of Staff, where she coordinated and directed activities among the various federal departments and agencies with defense and foreign policy responsibilities. In that capacity, she also played a role on Middle East peace efforts. From 1993-1997, she worked as chief counsel to the House Foreign Affairs Committee under Chairman Lee Hamilton (more bio here).

We will discuss issues related to war and peace in the Middle East. Readers can send questions to rosnersdomain@haaretz.co.il.

Dear Mara,

And what about Syria. If you were to be an Israeli leader, would you try to engage the Syrians? Do you think the Bush team should support such engagement? Under what conditions? No conditions? Do you think the Syrians are serious about peace? And how important is Lebanon when one comes to think about talks with Syria?

Best

Rosner

Dear Rosner,

You ask a series of questions that should each be assessed from the perspective of different states with independent national interests, some of which may be consistent, and some of which may differ.

First, let’s address U.S. interests with respect to the U.S. talking to Syria, U.S. interests with respect to what Israel may or may not do, and what role the U.S. may play vis-a-vis Lebanon. Certainly, it’s no state secret that the US remains a critical player for ultimate, sustainable resolution of all the region’s key conflicts, regardless of how much it - or other countries - might at times like to pretend otherwise.

Given the nature and scope of challenges facing the Middle East and Gulf, the United States should be calling all parties to the table to discuss all issues. For the United States, this is as good a time as any to be talking to Syria, at least at an exploratory level, about Iraq and the refugees it has had to absorb, the unacceptable arms flow across its border to Hezbollah, the home base it has provided for Hamas leadership, and also about how it plans to deal with an economic future several years out when its oil resources are gone, what kind of political horizon it sees for itself in the region if the Golan is returned and it has a peace agreement with Israel, and what changes it’s willing to make to achieve that more positive vision.

Would broaching these subjects mean the U.S. viewed Syria as serious about peace? No, it should not be seen that way. It should be seen as a sign that the U.S. was serious about assessing U.S. interests, and presenting Syria with clear options. Such conversations need not occur with fanfare, attention, or high expectations. They are made more difficult to be sure, without an Ambassador in country.

Israel and Syria, independent of the United States, have their own interests in starting direct talks. Certainly, as rhetoric about preparing for military conflict rises, responsible leaders must first fully explore all available options for resolving matters without resorting to war. Should such discussions begin, it seems likely both parties would expect to "seal the deal" only with the United States in the mix to ensure some of the benefits each would be seeking for having reached agreement.

If, however, more than the Golan is now on the table - if, as you suggest, Lebanon is the word not spoken but actually behind the curtain as the item of real value for Syria, then this part is not a discussion to be conducted by Israel.

If Syria really seeks greater control in Lebanon, that option simply should not be one that is one the table. And the international community will need to make this crystal clear. If Syria is looking instead for a way to step back from the brink threatened, for example, by the Hariri Tribunal, creative diplomats in the international community should be able to find some, while giving the Lebanese government new fortitude going forward, having gained firm commitments that minimize the Syrian threat and secure Lebanon?s borders.

So, even with possible Syrian-Israeli direct discussions, it’s likely only partly about Israel. For those Israeli interests, the right kind of talks, pitched at the right level, with the right expectations, and particularly if part of a broader comprehensive approach to the region led by the United States, actually might achieve some constructive results.

Best,

Mara

Dear Mara,

Today, an easy question. All I want is your analysis of the Bush Middle East peace speech from Monday.

Rosner

Dear Rosner,

The President’s speech on Monday, delivered a bit more than five years from his history-making Rose Garden statement calling for a Palestinian state before the end of his term, existing side-by-side in peace with Israel, was not more than the sum of its parts.

In sum, the speech added up to less than its parts, since the President seemed intent once again on fitting everything into a world of black and white, with us or against us, on terms that he defines, without doing the hard work to understand how and whether the people and places he’s talking about fit the categorizations he’s forcing.

But let’s look at the positive side of the equation first. The President spoke constructively about the Arab League Initiative, and Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, while making it clear that a complete end to West Bank occupation was now required. He described in concrete terms the work that President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayad had before them and were undertaking to strengthen Palestinian security, set up competent ministries to deliver services without corruption, and improve the economy. He committed to specific help in these areas. He called on Israel to take tangible steps, not only in removing settlements, but also in continuing to release Palestinian tax revenues, and reducing its West Bank "footprint." In doing so, he was sure to reiterate the long-standing U.S. commitment to Israel’s security. He also committed to an international meeting in the fall focused on working on the two-state solution.

So what’s not to like?

He spoke of the power of free elections with reference only to the result that he favored, the January 2005 presidential election of Mahmoud Abbas. His silence was glaring on the 2006 elections, which resulted in Hamas coming to power. As stark was his language on Hamas. He left no room for distinguishing between and among the many who may have run under their "Reform and Change" banner in January 2006. It remains unclear how much room will remain to sway the many Palestinians who voted for Reform and Change because they wanted exactly that, not because they supported a militant extremist radical Islamist anti-Israel agenda.

It would have been wiser to make clear why the actions that Hamas took in Gaza in June were unacceptable, and leave room for the Abbas/Fayad government and people to decide how, when, and if it can mend. At this point, the average Palestinian likely will need to see significant reform and change from all political forces, and a clearer path toward a political horizon as well.

Calling on Egypt and Jordan to open up trade because they offer natural gateways for Palestinian products was necessary but not sufficient, given that 80 percent of Palestinian market interaction is with Israel.

Mentioning former Prime Minister Blair’s new role in a narrowly defined way was embarrassing, and a missed opportunity.

Finally, calling for a long-awaited international meeting but making it clear that certain countries are not welcome is not an auspicious start. The President’s bully pulpit may be used to issue the general invitation. Adding and removing specific participants should be done in the process of figuring out what and who is most needed at the table to get the deals done, and who is willing to give what to get there.

It took President Bush five years to get back to his Rose Garden promises. He now has only 18 months to implement. In the time remaining, we should hold him to as many of the concrete positives he laid out Monday as we can, and ignore as much as possible his empty rhetoric.

Mara

Dear Mara,

In another recent article of yours (Learning from the Israel-Hizbullah War), you make a point that became almost a mantra for people critical of the performance of the Bush team. You write that "a high-level envoy must be appointed" and I would like to ask you this:

First, is this really the one missing building block with which to achieve peace, and second, why is it wrong on the administration’s part to decide that it doesn’t need an envoy and wants to operate in a different way than the one tried in the past (they will add that it has failed, which you might not agree with)?

Thank you,

Rosner

Dear Rosner,

Thank you for raising the issue of the role and import of appointing a high level envoy. This issue has been classically misinterpreted as a battle between Clinton and Bush administrations. That misses the point that I and others are making when we argue for such an appointment, or more recently, given former Prime Minister Blair’s recent assignment, for giving him the proper mandate for his high-level envoy position.

The current Bush administration has had plenty of special envoys, to the Middle East and everywhere else. The Clinton administration also had its share of special envoys, including one to the Middle East. With all due respect to these dedicated public servants, they cannot be compared with someone at the level of a former head of state, granted necessary scope, authority, and autonomy to work with the parties in a sustained and consistent manner and on a full time basis for as long as necessary to both manage the conflict and ultimately steer it toward resolution.

What is required now for the Middle East is someone of this stature, with a mandate that extends more broadly to cover the entire region, not only the Arab-Israeli conflict, who can roll up his or her sleeves, understands the politics, policies, and processes of all the players on the ground and in the international community, can bring the weight of the United States to the table when and as needed, and has the wisdom and perspective to know how to manage these various elements.

That envoy cannot be used a substitute for smart and sustained policy by the United States, and sound national security processes to develop it.

Wariness about the speed with which people revert to "envoys" as easy answers to difficult challenges is fair. It is too often akin to the old joke about trial lawyers. Given that one wants both facts and law in one?s favor to win a case, what does a trial lawyer do when the facts are against her? She pounds the law. What does she do when the law is against her? She pounds the facts. What does she do when both the facts and the law are against her? She pounds the table.

For U.S. Middle East policy, too often we take the "pounding the table" route with the envoy answer rather than tackling the truly tough issues: how hard does the United States press on Israeli settlement removal; when and how is it appropriate to draw the line on refugee return; what levers are available to achieve needed Palestinian reforms; why isn’t the U.S. capable of fielding more effective rule of law assistance to security forces and/or civil law enforcement institutions in these kind of situations; what strategies are we developing to work with, maintain, ensure a future for the Arab center in region; if, as we take a clear eyed accounting of U.S. interests in the region and the world and we conclude, as I do, that Israel’s long term survival as a democratic, Jewish state is clearly in our interest, why aren’t we investing more heavily in doing everything possible to ensure a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and broader resolution to the Israeli-Arab conflict, while such is still possible?

All those reasons for wariness aside, even skeptics like me have come to see that this mission now demands, and the parties, and the world, deserve, an envoy of the nature and stature of Tony Blair, with mandate to match, and Quartet representatives reporting to him while appropriately integrated into their governments’ national security processes.

Best,

Mara

Dear Mara,

In an article you wrote a month ago (Averting a deeper crisis in the Middle East) you specified the measures Americans, Israelis and Palestinians should take as to deal with the new circumstances in Gaza and turn this "current crisis" into "an opportunity".

Among them: Israel allowing an increased flow of people and goods throughout the West Bank; dismantlement of some settlements immediately as a sign of good faith; motivate Palestinian leaders to undertake significant reforms; efforts by the Arab League to support the Palestinian economy.

One month later, and assessing what the three players were doing so far, I would like you to give us a brief "progress report." Looking at the measures you’ve suggested, do you detect a movement in the right direction?

Best,

Rosner

Most everyone has started moving in the right direction, but much remains to be done.

First, the Americans: finesse is too often not an American strong suit, and particularly so this administration. Looking for ways to support President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayad concretely without smothering them in showboat embraces should be easier than the United States currently is making it appear.

Is the U.S. communicating with Israel the import of immediate movement on dismantling illegal and unauthorized outposts, and halting settlement expansion? Such action would improve security and law enforcement and rule of law issues for Israelis and Palestinians alike, and help the economy by making movement of people and goods easier.

How much or well the U.S. is pushing on needed reform measures within Fatah also remains a mystery. We can hope that in both cases, the administration has determined that private diplomacy is more effective than the public route, and we will see the results in the behavior of Israeli and Palestinian government actions in the near term.

Secretary Rice’s decision to postpone her trip to the region to deal with a U.S. Senate restive over Iraq was unfortunate. U.S. leadership in a sustained and consistent manner has been sorely lacking, and we need to show the region and the world that we appreciate the import of the current crisis and are maintaining our full commitment to working toward the two state solution laid out in President Bush’s Rose Garden statement of five years ago.

The U.S., with the Quartet, also should elevate and expand Tony Blair’s role. He must have broader negotiating authority that conveys a clear understanding that no one can be responsible for managing this conflict without simultaneously being able to set a political horizon and works toward it with all players involved.

The Arab League should continue to pursue its worthy diplomatic initiative, but also needs to step it up on the economic front, with humanitarian help as needed, but more directly with investment in the many worthy West Bank Palestinian businesses, and with commitments for future investment in Gazan business, where and as a political horizon is defined for a more fully functioning Palestinian state.

The Palestinians need to gain control over their own factions. The Al-Aqsa Brigades and others pose threats to law and order no less dangerous than Hamas’ Al-Qassem Brigades. With National Security Advisor Mohammed Dahlan’s departure, a welcome sign to many Palestinians looking for reform, President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayad will need to find a West Banker with strong security credentials who can run security forces without the corruption endemic in Dahlan’s reign and with the authority needed to enforce the rule of law.

In addition to showing the Palestinian people they can maintain law and order on the streets, they need to deliver tangible benefits in the near term: jobs, renewed access to schools and work, the promise of a better future.

Israel needs to continue ensuring Gaza’s lifeline to water, electricity, and food is maintained. Its IDF coordination units have been playing a critical role. And it should allow Abbas and Fayad full authority to distribute Palestinian tax revenues in Gaza in whatever manner they determine appropriate.

Finally, Israel also needs to immediately improve movement and access of people and goods within the West Bank, and the ability to export goods from the West Bank, and to take long promised actions on settlements and illegal outposts. While not without risk for Israel, these actions serve Israel’s interests directly, and ultimately offer a far less risky route than not so acting.