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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

09/04/08
From Zero-Sum to Win-Win  —Mara Rudman, adviser, Middle East Progress; senior fellow, Center for American Progress. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.
09/04/08
How Progress Is Possible  —
08/07/08
How to Deal with Jerusalem  —Lt. Col. (Res.) Ron Shatzberg, Project Director, Economic Cooperation Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.

Setting the Record Straight

Two-State Solution Still Best Option

“In practical terms, we can reach two conclusions: First, a final-status agreement, although its details are known, cannot be secured in the foreseeable future. Second, the time has come to think about other solutions. One of them is a return not to the 1967 borders, but rather, to the reality that prevailed in 1967, when Jordan controlled the West Bank.”
—Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland, “The Jordanian Option,” YNet, September 3, 2008 versus
  • "On both sides of the green line and, indeed, wherever people think about solutions to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, a lot of old/new thinking is taking place. … Most of these ideas are patently unrealistic. Discussion of them often reflects despair, not pragmatic strategic thinking. … Precisely because there is no such alternative, other options more readily suggest themselves, ranging from temporary conflict management to three states or entities. Nor does failure today mean that tomorrow we cannot try again to arrive at a two-state solution, which remains the best option for all."
    —Yossi Alpher, coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications & former director, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, "One State Definitely Not an Option," bitterlemons.org, August 18, 2008
  • Middle East Analysis

    • How Progress Is Possible —Hiba Husseini, chair, Legal Committee to Final Status Negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis; former vice chairperson of the Palestine Securities Exchange (1998-May 2005). Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
    • Perils of an Israeli Transition —The New York Times, Editorial
    • The Arabs Will Look Differently Upon America —Ron Pundak, director general of the Peres Center for Peace and former architects and negotiators of the Oslo Agreement (bitterlemons.org)
    October 22, 2007

    Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Syrian President Bashar Assad (AP)

    For the last five years, Russia’s role in the international search for peace in the Middle East has been realized within the framework of the Quartet. Moscow made the decision to join the international mediators for several reasons… The Quartet provided the best possible framework for the resumption of active Russian mediation because as an international endeavor it would guarantee that a one-sided approach was rejected. …

    [However] with no breakthrough in view and with the U.S. trapped in Iraq, the Russian leadership–more confident now due to newly acquired resources–began its own calculation to balance its strategic and economic interests that span the Arab-Israel divide. Russia thus started a more active and independent course in the region. In 2005, Putin visited Egypt and Israel, and in 2007 he went to Saudi Arabia. The visits served to demonstrate Russia’s return to the scene after a long period of political, military, and economic withdrawal.

    In the context of the peace process, Russia also has an advantage over the EU and the U.S. in that it can speak to regional actors usually labeled "spoilers" in the West. This list includes not only countries like Iran and Syria, with their significant influence over regional developments, but also radical organizations like Hamas and Hizbullah… Russia still has economic, military and political interests in the region. These do not necessarily correspond with those of the U.S. and the EU, and that is their utility. Moscow remains a pragmatic player, and in this capacity it can help the Quartet moderate the irreconcilable positions of the conflicting parties. Access the full article>>