(All Information provided by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, unless otherwise noted)
National Intelligence Estimates: An NIE is the most authoritative opinion of the U.S. intelligence community on a specified issue. They are written to help policymakers and military leaders craft policies to protect national security interests. Representatives from the relevant intelligence agencies coordinate the text line by line. It is reviewed by the National Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the Director of National Intelligence and composed of the heads of the intelligence agencies. Once it has been approved by the board, policymakers are briefed on the estimate’s findings.
2005: Last NIE on Iran’s nuclear weapons program
Key Findings of 2007 NIE compared to 2005 NIE
Existence and Intentions of Nuclear Weapons Program
2005: NIE assesses with high confidence that Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons despite international pressures, but also finds that Iran is not immovable on this point.
2007: NIE assesses with high confidence that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program (including any possible covert programs) in 2003, primarily in response to international scrutiny. NIE is moderately confident that the program has not been restarted as of mid-2007, but is also moderately to highly confident that Iran is (at minimum) keeping the option to develop nuclear weapons open.
Time-Frame to Nuclear Weapons Production
2005: Intelligence community is moderately confident that Iran is likely to make a nuclear weapon, but probably not before early to mid 2010s.
2007: Intelligence community is moderately confident that Iran could make a nuclear weapon by 2009 at the earliest, but that it is very unlikely Iran will do so.
Uranium Enrichment Capabilities
2005: It is possible for Iran to produce a nuclear weapon from fissile material by 2010 if it makes more rapid and successful progress than it has thus far.
2007: There is moderate confidence that Iran is technically capable of enriching enough uranium to build a weapon by 2009 at the earliest, but that this development is unlikely. The NIE judges with low confidence that Iran has imported some nuclear fissile material, but not enough to build a weapon.
NIE Suggestions for Extending the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Halt
• Iran gave up its nuclear programs in 2003 due to international pressures. According to the NIE, this suggests that the right combinations of pressures and the offer of an alternative way for Iran to achieve its security and prestige goals, may lead to an extended halt of the program.
• The NIE asserts with moderate confidence that getting Iranian leadership to give up the nuclear program will be difficult, but that only a political decision by these leaders will lead to an abandonment of this objective
• It is unknown if the suspension of the weapons program is indefinite, or subject to pre-determined deadlines or criteria. The intelligence community is highly confident that Iran does have the expertise to develop a nuclear weapon if they choose.