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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

09/04/08
From Zero-Sum to Win-Win  —Mara Rudman, adviser, Middle East Progress; senior fellow, Center for American Progress. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.
09/04/08
How Progress Is Possible  —
08/07/08
How to Deal with Jerusalem  —Lt. Col. (Res.) Ron Shatzberg, Project Director, Economic Cooperation Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.

Setting the Record Straight

Two-State Solution Still Best Option

“In practical terms, we can reach two conclusions: First, a final-status agreement, although its details are known, cannot be secured in the foreseeable future. Second, the time has come to think about other solutions. One of them is a return not to the 1967 borders, but rather, to the reality that prevailed in 1967, when Jordan controlled the West Bank.”
—Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland, “The Jordanian Option,” YNet, September 3, 2008 versus
  • "On both sides of the green line and, indeed, wherever people think about solutions to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, a lot of old/new thinking is taking place. … Most of these ideas are patently unrealistic. Discussion of them often reflects despair, not pragmatic strategic thinking. … Precisely because there is no such alternative, other options more readily suggest themselves, ranging from temporary conflict management to three states or entities. Nor does failure today mean that tomorrow we cannot try again to arrive at a two-state solution, which remains the best option for all."
    —Yossi Alpher, coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications & former director, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, "One State Definitely Not an Option," bitterlemons.org, August 18, 2008

    • Middle East Analysis

    • How Progress Is Possible —Hiba Husseini, chair, Legal Committee to Final Status Negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis; former vice chairperson of the Palestine Securities Exchange (1998-May 2005). Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
    • Perils of an Israeli Transition —The New York Times, Editorial
    • The Arabs Will Look Differently Upon America —Ron Pundak, director general of the Peres Center for Peace and former architects and negotiators of the Oslo Agreement (bitterlemons.org)

    The Gaza-Egypt Border

    January 25, 2008

    Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Syrian President Bashar Assad (AP)

    The border between Gaza and Egypt was established by the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Agreement, and is demarcated by an eight-to-nine-foot-high wall built in 2001 after an increase in Israeli-Palestinian fighting. Originally under Egyptian and Israeli control, Israel agreed to evacuate the 8-mile-long Egypt-Gaza border, known as the Philadelphi Corridor, in September 2005 as part of its wider disengagement from Gaza. Under terms brokered by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, an Egyptian Border Guard Force (BGF) was established to maintain security and prevent smuggling between Gaza and Egypt. The BGF is limited to 750 soldiers with light weapons and is strictly separated from the Egyptian military. The new force was deployed into the Philadelphi Corridor on September 10, 2005 and Israeli soldiers withdrew on September 12, 2005.

    Nearly immediately after Israeli troops withdrew, Gazans overwhelmed the BGF and streamed into Egypt through the Rafah crossing, the primary gateway between Egypt and Gaza. Rafah is monitored remotely by Israel and by an on-site mission from the European Union under the November 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access. Egypt was able to secure the border a few days later, but smuggling has continued between Gaza and Egypt.

    Israel has consistently complained that Egypt is not doing enough to stop smuggling into Gaza through underground tunnels dug between Egypt and Gaza. Egypt, however, has asserted that it does not have enough BGF to patrol the border effectively. On June 9, 2007, Egypt and Israel closed border crossings, including the Rafah crossing, after Hamas took control of Gaza. Although the EU monitoring mission has been extended until May 2008, it is not currently deployed at the crossing. Egypt claimed smuggling decreased shortly after Hamas took control, but Israel contends that smuggling has continued unabated. The United States recently intervened to attempt to remedy the situation. Egypt requested doubling the number of BGF to 1,500, but Israel rejected the request, stating that the problem is not the number of guards but a lack of motivation. Tension between Israel and Egypt regarding Gaza was growing even before recent events due to Israeli accusations that Egypt is complicit in the smuggling.

    Current Situation

    Early on January 23, 2008, masked gunmen blew a series of holes in the barrier separating Egypt and Gaza, in the culmination of work that may have begun as early as one month ago. Crowds developed and streamed through the holes and the Rafah border crossing, with Egyptian border guards making no attempt to stop them. Israel has protested Egypt’s loss of control of the border and one official has suggested that Israel no longer wants ties with Gaza. Egypt, however, has begun the process of reestablishing the border and has stated that this was a temporary response to the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

    Follow these links for more information on Gaza’s population and economy, humanitarian aid and economic effects, or role in Israeli/Palestinian trade.