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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

08/07/08
How to Deal with Jerusalem  —Lt. Col. (Res.) Ron Shatzberg, Project Director, Economic Cooperation Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
08/07/08
How to Deal with Jerusalem  —
08/05/08
Why Did Maliki Call for a Timeline?  —by Christopher Kojm who teaches at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and is a former senior advisor to the Iraq Study Group. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.

Setting the Record Straight

Already Divided

“Even the Arab minority in the city has shown its preference for living under Israeli rule, as many have moved to the Israeli side of the security barrier being built around Jerusalem. Their choice is reasonable, as Jerusalem offers the quality of life of a modern western city while only a few kilometers away the norm is a third world standard of living, chaos and religious intolerance. An undivided Jerusalem is the best guarantee of a better life for all Jerusalemites.”
—Nathan Diament, Director of Public Policy, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, July 23, 2008 versus
  • “Those who believe that Jerusalem should not be divided, and mean by that that the Arab neighborhoods should not be separated from the city, should be the first to insist that an active policy be adopted by the government and the municipality to improve the lot of local Arab residents. Barring that, Jerusalem will continue to remain a divided city.”
    —Moshe Arens, former Israeli defense and foreign minister (Likud), “A Story of Neglect,” Haaretz, July 28, 2008
  • Middle East Analysis

    February 22, 2008

    The White House has long insisted that there was no choice but to look the other way as Mr. Musharraf jailed journalists and lawyers, dismissed the Supreme Court and declared emergency rule. Islamist extremists, we were told, would win any fair democratic fight. Instead, even with a rigged system, the moderates managed to win. Now the question is whether the Bush administration can take this opportunity and develop a sensible policy that focuses both on building stable democratic institutions in Pakistan and winning popular support for combating Al Qaeda and the Taliban. …

    Make no mistake, Mr. Musharraf’s support for the war on terrorism was never as unstinting as Washington claimed. Al Qaeda and the Taliban have found far too comfortable a safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal regions. Still, persuading Pakistan’s new civilian leaders to sign on to the fight is likely to prove even more difficult … some of those politicians were already talking about the need for more dialogue and less military confrontation with the extremists. The Bush administration will have to work hard to persuade them—and the Pakistani people—that this is not just Washington’s fight. These extremists are also a direct threat to Pakistan and its hopes for democracy.

    Washington can start by sending a clear message that it cares about Pakistan’s people and that it will do a lot more to build up its schools, courts and political parties. The lesson of the last six years—and Mr. Musharraf’s defeat—is undeniable: without popular support, there will be no stability in Pakistan and no hope of defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Access the full article>>