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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

09/04/08
From Zero-Sum to Win-Win  —Mara Rudman, adviser, Middle East Progress; senior fellow, Center for American Progress. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.
09/04/08
How Progress Is Possible  —
08/07/08
How to Deal with Jerusalem  —Lt. Col. (Res.) Ron Shatzberg, Project Director, Economic Cooperation Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.

Setting the Record Straight

Two-State Solution Still Best Option

“In practical terms, we can reach two conclusions: First, a final-status agreement, although its details are known, cannot be secured in the foreseeable future. Second, the time has come to think about other solutions. One of them is a return not to the 1967 borders, but rather, to the reality that prevailed in 1967, when Jordan controlled the West Bank.”
—Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland, “The Jordanian Option,” YNet, September 3, 2008 versus
  • "On both sides of the green line and, indeed, wherever people think about solutions to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, a lot of old/new thinking is taking place. … Most of these ideas are patently unrealistic. Discussion of them often reflects despair, not pragmatic strategic thinking. … Precisely because there is no such alternative, other options more readily suggest themselves, ranging from temporary conflict management to three states or entities. Nor does failure today mean that tomorrow we cannot try again to arrive at a two-state solution, which remains the best option for all."
    —Yossi Alpher, coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications & former director, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, "One State Definitely Not an Option," bitterlemons.org, August 18, 2008

    • Middle East Analysis

    • How Progress Is Possible —Hiba Husseini, chair, Legal Committee to Final Status Negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis; former vice chairperson of the Palestine Securities Exchange (1998-May 2005). Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
    • Perils of an Israeli Transition —The New York Times, Editorial
    • The Arabs Will Look Differently Upon America —Ron Pundak, director general of the Peres Center for Peace and former architects and negotiators of the Oslo Agreement (bitterlemons.org)

    The Price of the Surge

    Steven Simon, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies, Council on Foreign Relations (Foreign Affairs)
    April 23, 2008

    Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Syrian President Bashar Assad (AP)

    In January 2007, President George W. Bush announced a new approach to the war in Iraq. … With a "surge" in troops, a new emphasis on counter- insurgency strategy, and new commanders overseeing that strategy, Bush declared, the deteriorating situation could be turned around.

    More than a year on, a growing conventional wisdom holds that the surge has paid off handsomely. … Unfortunately, such claims misconstrue the causes of the recent fall in violence and, more important, ignore a fatal flaw in the strategy. … The problem is that this strategy to reduce violence is not linked to any sustainable plan for building a viable Iraqi state. If anything, it has made such an outcome less likely, by stoking the revanchist fantasies of Sunni Arab tribes and pitting them against the central government and against one another. In other words, the recent short-term gains have come at the expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq. …

    At this stage, the United States has no good option in Iraq. … Washington must return to the kind of diplomacy that the Bush administration has largely neglected. Even with 160,000 troops in Iraq, Washington lacks the leverage on its own to push the Maliki government to take meaningful steps to accommodate Sunni concerns and thereby empower Sunni moderates. … What the United States could not do unilaterally, it must try to do with others, including neighboring countries, European allies, and the United Nations (UN).

    In order to attain that kind of cooperation, Washington must make a public commitment to a phased withdrawal. … Currently, the dominant U.S. presence in Iraq allows the rest of the world to avoid responsibility for stability in and around Iraq even as everyone realizes the stakes involved. A plan to draw down U.S. forces would therefore contribute to the success of a larger diplomatic strategy, prompting Middle Eastern states, European governments, and the UN to be more constructive and proactive in working to salvage stability in the Persian Gulf. …

    This course is risky and possibly futile. Yet it is still a better bet than a fashionable, short-term fix divorced from any larger political vision for Iraq and the Middle East. Access the full article>>