As much as Pakistan suffers at the hands of Islamist insurgents, the country’s powerful military intelligence agency, Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI), has tolerated the Taliban, which it views as a backup force for asserting control of Afghanistan if the United States suddenly decides to cut and run. … [O]nly a long-term U.S. commitment will convince Pakistan’s government to end its tolerance for the militant groups headquartered on the country’s western border. …
To help tamp down the insurgency in FATA and other areas of the NWFP, the United States should help the Pakistanis build up their counterinsurgency capabilities. The Pakistani army is built for a land war with India, not for fighting terrorists and insurgents. Pakistani officers should be encouraged to attend counterinsurgency courses at U.S. war colleges, and the United States should support such courses at Pakistan’s National Defense University. None of this would cost a lot of U.S. dollars and would yield potentially large results, as the new U.S. counterinsurgency strategy has done in Iraq.
Small amounts of U.S. aid in support of deradicalization programs for jailed Pakistani militants could also yield large returns. Such programs have had some success in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Singapore, but have not been tried in Pakistan. Pakistani officials would benefit from learning about best practices in countries that have already spent years in building up their own counter-radicalization programs. Access the full article>>