A Deeper Look at Prisoner Exchanges

by Lt. General (Ret.) Orit Adato, former commissioner of the Israeli Prison Service; first international vice president, International Correction and Prison Association (ICPA). Interview with Middle East Bulletin.

What is the current status of Palestinian prisoners jailed in Israel? What is their importance to the peace process?

There are currently about 11,000 Palestinians defined as security inmates/ detainees in Israeli prisons. Palestinian culture makes the issue relevant to almost every family both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The average Palestinian on the street can relate more easily to prisoners than to one settlement or another or the right of return for refugees. Thus, although prisoners are not in the headlines on a regular basis, this is one of the core issues of Israeli-Palestinian political discussions. By the way, this is not unique to us. There are many similarities to Northern Ireland where the release of prisoners was an integral part of the Good Friday Agreement.

In my opinion, prisoner releases are not normally in the news because both sides know it can be resolved relatively easily, compared to the other core issues, as part of an agreement. We would be wise, however, not to wait to address the issue only as part of a final agreement at the end of a process but to use it to move the process itself in the right direction. We need a strong leadership that can face the public and make difficult decisions, including the release of some Palestinians from Israeli jails, from a position of strength at a time of strength rather than a position of weakness (like the exchange of Israeli POWs). Instead of reacting to circumstances, Israel should be initiating the unavoidable release of some security inmates. There are families of terror victims who understand the situation and despite great losses are willing to endorse some prisoner releases publicly.

How can the issue be addressed?

Israel has to turn Palestinian prisoners from a burden into an asset and use them to build trust on the other side and gain leverage for peace. Not all 11,000 prisoners are really terrorists, however a lot of them are defined by Israel as having “blood on their hands.” This definition should be changed in order to move forward. In my view, the first phase of dealing with the issue should be classifying the 11,000 prisoners into subgroups. According to data, 2,500-3,000 prisoners are considered the “hard core”—murderers, planners of terror attacks and recruiters of young men and women to terrorism.

Another group is comprised of 3,000-4,000 prisoners whom I would not even grant the title terrorists. Indeed, they were involved in illegal activities, yet the title of “terrorists” grants them a status of heroes, freedom warriors and victims of the Israeli occupation. This in turn not only glorifies them at home but also makes them and their families eligible for compensation from the Palestinian Authority in the form of monthly salaries, a heavy financial burden on the already struggling Authority. Most of them are minor criminals—burglars, car thieves, and so forth. When this group shares cells with ideological terror leaders, they only become more dangerous.

Within this group you can find also regular people, not criminals, who in a time of crisis were asked, for example, to pass on a note from one place to another for few hundred shekels, not a small sum of money for most Palestinians. They were involved in a process which led to Israeli casualties and are therefore defined as security inmates, with some having blood on their hands. They were not real terrorists when imprisoned, but will be terrorists when they are eventually released.

The remaining 4,000 prisoners can be defined as somehow between these two groups: they were involved directly in terror activities, knew what they were doing, but were not as extremist as the first group.

In which group you would include Marwan Barghouti?

I don’t know. Perhaps Barghouti is playing a double game—to the outside he speaks pragmatically about a diplomatic track and two-state solution. However, in a judicial process, which I trust, it was proved beyond doubt that he was involved in terrorism. It wouldn’t be a first. Yasser Arafat played a similar game in his time. Perhaps Barghouti has to demonstrate to the Palestinians that he is committed to violent resistance to Israel to rally support so that he can lead in the future.

How would you handle classification?

Making the classification is the first difficult task. After that, the first group of extremists—who in my view are truly committed to the destruction of Israel—should be neutralized. They should be placed in two prisons in the south of Israel, in isolation from other prisoners, with minimal rights according to Israeli and international law. This will ensure that they are not rewarded for their murderous acts and cannot affect others who are less inclined to terrorism.

The second group of “small fish” should get an opportunity for rehabilitation. Their definition should be changed to criminal prisoners, a process which would require their renouncement of all illegal activities. Their imprisonment conditions would improve and perhaps even include vocational training, which should be coordinated with the Palestinian Authority and the international community. This would help these prisoners obtain jobs upon their release and make them less likely to resort to terrorism. It would also help us both in the short and the long run. On average, every prisoner costs the state of Israel 120,000 shekels per year. Release of a few thousand would ease the burden on the system. In the long run, it would prevent the recruitment of many young Palestinians into terror cells, a common process in prison, and more importantly, immediately strengthen the PA and Mahmoud Abbas, our partner for peace, which is the primary way of ensuring Israel’s security.

After the isolation of the first group and the declared intentions to rehabilitate the second group, the third group of prisoners would have to make a choice—either the terrorist path or the chance to live normally again among their family and friends. The families, aware of the two options, would likely urge their relatives to choose the latter, thus bolstering a process beneficial for Israel. To ensure the effectiveness of the process, the PA should have a functioning body—a committee or organization—dedicated to rehabilitation of prisoners and monitoring their progress after their release. Moreover, there will be international monitoring of the process

What about the concern that they might revert to their old ways?

Some reversion is unavoidable. But it is known that the percentage of security inmates going back to terrorism is much smaller than among criminal prisoners who go back to crime. The sooner we start to implement a strategic plan with the PA for rehabilitation, the fewer terrorists we’ll have to handle. Again, we have to remember that once the families of security inmates see that by doing the right thing, their relatives can win a second chance to live normally and freely, they would have an incentive to press them to stay out of trouble.

Does the international community, and especially the United States, have a role in such a process?

The international community should be involved in designing the release and rehabilitation programs, funding it and primarily in monitoring its implementation. One option could be that the PA reports to a specific team on the progress of the implementation, i.e., how many prisoners obtained jobs, in which sectors, how many resorted to violence etc. In addition to funding the program directly, the international community could help the PA with creating jobs that give priority to released prisoners. Despite recent improvement, the Palestinian economy is not doing well, to say the least. Thus, finding employment for thousands of released prisoners would be extremely difficult without the help of the international community. Providing jobs for Palestinians who otherwise would have been unemployed would also serve the major players’ interest in bolstering Abbas and undermining Hamas. At the immediate level, the international community can help by bringing the topic back up for discussion and offering help.

What is your take on the emerging prisoner exchange deals with Hezbollah and Hamas?

In general, those deals are not a first and reflect the Israeli reality throughout the years. The problem is that when there is no initiative to release prisoners gradually, in coordination with the PA and the international community, as part of the peace talks, Israel de facto is only responding to terrorists. This not only undermines our partner for peace but also makes future kidnappings, god forbid, more likely.

It is too late now, but what should have been done in both cases—with Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev and with Gilad Shalit—was to negotiate quietly after the kidnappings. The price then would have been much smaller.

Specifically now, I am more concerned about the ramifications of the deal with Hamas than that with Hezbollah. The major problem in the negotiations with Hezbollah is the terrorist Samir Kuntar. He is indeed an evil murderer and nothing that I say can change this. Yet, he was jailed when he was 17 years old and has spent the last 30 years in an Israeli prison. No other murderer served time in prison for that long a period of time. The average is 17-20 years. The reason he was imprisoned for that long is that he was considered a bargaining chip that could be used to get information on the captive navigator Ron Arad. But now, when it is clear there is no such information, he is not so valuable. What Israel should have done is say upfront and long ago that unfortunately keeping Kuntar in prison would not help in finding out what happened to Ron Arad. In practice, when Hezbollah treats him like a hero, and Israelis respond accordingly, Kuntar is glorified, while in my opinion he is not such a big price to pay. Even now, it is not too late for Israel to say that publicly and ridicule Hezbollah’s claims that it won. I must say, though, that the state of Israel acted courageously when it declared Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev dead. Hassan Nasrallah initially demanded the swap of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners and lowered his demands after he realized that Israel—through this statement and through the mediators—would not be willing to cede that much.

As for the deal with Hamas for Gilad Shalit, Israel will have to pay an extremely high price, estimated at almost 1,000 prisoners, including dozens of murderers. I haven’t seen the list but can imagine that it includes leadership—former parliament members and ministers, and Fatah activists. Beyond the creation of incentive to kidnap more soldiers—clearly it pays off—it bodes ill for the negotiations with Abbas. Instead of bolstering him by freeing prisoners, we respond to the demands of a terror group. How will that make Abbas look? Instead of initiating from a position of strength, we surrender when pushed to the corner.

What can be done now?

We have moved beyond the point of no return in the negotiations with Hamas and Hezbollah. Yet, in the end of the process, something has to change in the public discourse. The government needs to announce a policy change and to say that by acting the way we do, we in fact encourage more kidnapping of soldiers. We need to state publicly that Israel would do all in its power to bring its soldiers back home but would not pay any price.

Something has changed in my view in Israel in the last few years. The rhetoric being used is “bring the kids home.” There have always been young people involved, in 1948 they may have even been children, but they were not treated as such. We have to plan our tactics well and ensure minimum casualties but we cannot fight virtually. This cannot be the only factor determining policy. In the Second Lebanon War, the fear that anything might happen to soldiers made the decision process flawed from the beginning. Recently, the IDF relocated a base near Gaza following pressure from the parents after the base was hit by rockets. De facto, the fear for the life of soldiers put Israeli citizens on the front lines. Israel’s leadership has to be courageous and promise to do all it can to protect the lives of soldiers, but the military has to be the first line of defense.

We have to remember, though, that every crisis is an opportunity and this case is not an exception. It is not too late to minimize the damage. In an expedited process Israel should now announce an organized plan to release prisoners as part of the diplomatic track with Abbas. The announcement alone and a real move toward implementing such a plan would immediately boost Abbas’ popularity. From my experience, it is possible to present a blueprint of such a program within a month or two. Initiating a plan, rather than responding to terrorists demands and strong internal public pressure, would start a process in which each side—Israel, the PA and the international community—assumes responsibility. If we don’t plan the next step ahead of time, we might find ourselves in the same situation again.