Moving Forward in Lebanon After Doha

President Suleiman (AP) "Ultimately, Lebanon’s political leaders will need to bridge their deep differences through compromises that put the national interest ahead of confessional rivalries."

Moving Forward in Lebanon After Doha: Bridging Deep Divides

by Mona Yacoubian, director of the Lebanon Working Group, U.S. Institute of Peace. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.

More than one month after the May 21st Doha agreement, Lebanon remains poised on the verge of civil war. It does so not only because Lebanon’s rival factions have made little progress on implementing the agreement, but also because not enough is being done to bridge the country’s factional divides.

Negotiations on the formation of a unity government remain stalled. Meanwhile, sectarian fighting—most recently in the northern city of Tripoli—continues to plague the country. Barring serious mediation efforts to defuse tensions between Prime Minister Fuad Siniora’s March 14 coalition and the Hezbollah-led opposition (also known as the March 8 coalition), the tenuous accord between the deeply polarized factions is likely to unravel.

The Qatar-brokered truce—negotiated following the most serious outbreak of sectarian violence since Lebanon’s 15-year civil war ended in 1990—helped to break an 18-month political impasse by paving the way for the election of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) commander General Michel Suleiman as president. Aside from Suleiman’s election, the agreement calls for a new electoral law in advance of next year’s parliamentary elections and the formation of a national unity government, with 11 cabinet seats (known as the “blocking third” veto) apportioned to the Hezbollah-led opposition.